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TORTS
SAM DANIELS
INTRODUCTION* *
This survey is written to help lawyers find cases in point. The emphasis
is on facts rather than theory. It took nine years to fill the first seventeen
volumes of the Southern Reporter, whereas the last seventeen volumes
were produced in only two years. Even the specialist has difficulty keeping
abreast in his limited field. With these thoughts in mind, the material
covered is outlined as follows:
I. AUTOMOBILE CASES
A. The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine
B. The Guest Statute
C. Care Required of Motorists
1. INTERSECTION ACCIDENTS
2. REAR-END COLLISIONS
3. PEDESTRIANS-LAST CLEAR CHIANCE
4. OTIHER NEGLIGENT OPERATION
5. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
II. STATUTORY LIABILITY
A. Dog Owner's Liability
B. Railroad Operation
C. Jones and Federal Employers' Liability Acts
I1. COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
A. Landlord and Tenant
B. Common Carriers
C. Distribution of Electricity
D. Doctor-Patient
E. Manufacturers and Suppliers
F. Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers
C. Care Owed Invitees
1. INJURIES NOT INVOLVING FALLS
2. SLIP, TRIP AND FALL
•Member of the Florida Bar. Formerly Assistant Professor of Law, School of Law, Uni.
versity of Miami.
*The material surveyed attempts to include all significant state and federal decisions
from August of 1957 to August of 1959 which dealt with Florida tort law.
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H. Master-Servant
I. Warranty
J. Defenses in Common Law Cases
1. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
2. ASStMPTION OF RISK
3. RELEASE
4. Immun
5. MUNICIPAL NOTICE PROVISIONS
K. Res Ipsa Loquitur
L. Damages
IV. OTIIER CoMroN LAw TORTS
I. AUTOMOBILE CASES
A. The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine produced ten decisions and
some extremely important holdings. In the Leonard litigation'-it was held
that a U-Drive-It Company could not escape responsibility by a contractual
prohibition against use of the automobile by anyone other than the lessee.
In affirming the district court's opinion, the supreme court held:
On the fundamental issue, the simple but sound statement
of the district court can be unequivocally endorsed:
"When this defendant turns over an automobile to another
for a price, he in actuality intrusts that automobile to the renter
for all ordinary purposes for which an automobile is rented. The
fact that the owner had a private contract or secret agreement
with the renter cannot make such restrictions a bar to the rights
of the public. The restrictions agreed upon do not change the
fact that the automobile was being used with the owner's consent.
Nor does it appear that the car was not being used for the purpose
for which it was rented i.e., the pleasure, convenience or business
of the renter .. "
Another U-Drive-It restriction was held invalid in a case when the
rental contract prohibited removal of the vehicle from the State of
Georgia; the contract provision was held to be no defense when the
vehicle was taken to Florida.2
The doctrine became a two-edged sword in Weber v. Porco.3 The
supreme court squarely held that the driver's negligence is imputed to
the owner in the owner's action against a third party. Negligence of
the driver-husband was held imputable to the owner-wife who was a
passenger. The court was quick to point out that negligence was not
I. Leonard v. Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla., 103 So.2d 243 (Fla. App. 1958),
aff'd, 112 So.2d 832, 835 (FlI. 1959).
2. Bowman v. Atlantic Baggage & Cab Co., 173 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Fla. 1959).
3. 100 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1958), followed in Gulick v. Whitaker, 102. So2d 847
(Vla. App. 1958).
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imputed "merely because of the relationship of husband and wife," but
was imputed "because she owns the automobile and permits him to
drive it."
A number of cases dealt with the question of who is liable under the
doctrine. The doctrine imposes liability on the "owner" of the vehicle
and on "non-owners" having dominion and control over the vehicle.
The leading decision on the control issue is Re-mark Chemical Co.
v. Ross.4 Ain employee owned an automobile and turned it in to the
employer-corporation which thereafter paid the upkeep and operating
expenses and exercised dominion and control over it. The corporation lent
the automobile to another employee who had an accident on the way to
work. A jury finding of company responsibility was affirmed on appeal
with a succinct holding that:
One who has possession, and the dominion and control of an
automobile, even though not the record owner thereof, will be
liable for injury caused by the negligence of another person using
the automobile with the knowledge and consent of the person
having such dominion and control over the vehicle ...
On the ownership question, a person is not an "owner" even though
the registered title is in his name, if the vehicle was sold before the
accident. Under common law sales principles which determine the issue,
the intent of the parties as to when title passed is the "cardinal factor"
and "delivery of the goods is of the greatest importance, as evincing an
intention to pass title. 5
Three cases applied these common law sales principles. In the
McAfee case,6 defendant left his automobile at a filling station with
instructions to sell it for $450 or $500. \Vhile the defendant was on
vacation, Lowery drove the automobile for one day and took it the next
day after giving the filling station operator a $200 deposit. The station
operator told Lowery he would have defendant contact him when he
returned. The accident happened before contact was made. The defendant
testified he considered the automobile to be Lowery's when the $200 was
paid; whereas, Lowery testified he had not decided to buy the automobile
and was still testing it. On this conflicting evidence, a jury finding of a
sale by the defendant before the accident was affirmed on appeal.
In Barnett v. Butler,7 the defendant held registered title to an auto-
mobile which he turned over to an employee under a "rather loose" oral
agreement whereby $8.00- a week was to be deducted from the employee's
wages until the purchase price was paid. The accident occurred while
4. 101 So.2d 163, 165 (Fia. App. 1958).
5. McAfee v. Killingsworth, 98 So.2d 738, 740 (Fla. 1957).
6. Ibid.
7. 112 So.2d 907 (Fla. App. 1959).
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this agreement was in effect. The trial judge denied discovery as to
whether the defendant carried liability insurance on the automobile; refused
to admit evidence that defendant did carry insurance; and directed a verdict
for the defendant on the ground that, as a matter of law, there was a
sale before the accident. The case was reversed with holdings that
evidence as to the defendant's liability insurance was admissible and that
this evidence coupled with other facts in the case created a jury question.
In one case," the jury finding of a sale to a new automobile dealer
was reversed with a holding that as a matter of law title did not pass
before the accident. Murphy took a used automobile to a new automobile
dealer and made a contract to trade his automobile in on a new one.
The contract stated that it was subject to approval by the dealer and that
the order was not valid unless the required financing could be obtained.
Murphy then took the used automobile home and bad an accident before
the financing was obtained.
In another case," the registered title holder attempted to prove she
merely took title to help her minor nephew obtain financing, and that
the minor paid for, operated and maintained the automobile. The aunt
admittedly obtained insurance on the automobile and complied with the
Virginia Automobile Assigned Risk Plan. The trial judge refused to admit
the proffered "non-ownership" evidence and held the aunt liable as a
matter of law. The case was affirmed oii the ground that the aunt had
"ownership in a sufficient degree to justify the court in declining to
submit the matter to a jury." 10
In Lambert v. Johnson, it was held that when there was a completed
sale before the accident, the mcrc fact that the dealer's license tag remained
on the automobile did not preclude a summary judgment in the dealer's favor.
B. The Guest Statute
The Guest Statute' 2 denies innocent victims any recovery for negligently
inflicted injuries. This result is contrary to common law concepts of right and
justice,' and the unmistakable judicial trend is to water down the statute
as much as possible. The decisions defining gross negligence and deciding
who are guests clearly illustrate this process.
8. Huskamp Motor Co. v. Hebden, 104 So.2d 96 (Fla. App. 1958).
9. Metzel v. Robinson, 102 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1958).
10. Id. at 386.
11. 109 So.2d 187 (Fla. App. 1959). The trial judge's opinion is reported at 12
Fla. Supp. 57 (Duval Cir. 1958).
12. FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1959).
13. "Since, therefore, Section 320.59 is a restriction on and in derogation of a
common law right, such statute may be extended only so far as a strict construction of
the language of the statute makes it imperative." Summersett v. Linkroum, 44 So.2d 662,
664 (Ela. 1950).
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What is Gross Negligence?
Justice Drew's painstaking opinion in Carraway v. Revell, 4 delineates
and defines the degrees of negligence in Florida and attempts to give
the bench and bar as much guidance as is possible in such a ncbulous
area. The opinion places gross negligence as the middle ground between
simple and culpable negligence. While Baron Rolfe could remark that
gross negligence is merely negligence "with the addition of vituperative
epithet,"Iri he was not faced with a legislative command to divide Gaul
into three parts.
Eight opinions decided gross negligence questions. Gross negligence
was held a jury question in six of the eight cases. Of the six cases, three
involved drivers who ran into parked automobiles; 6 two involved failure
to negotiate curves; 7 and one involved losing control of an automobile
while entering an arterial highway from a private road.' 8 Of the drivers
who escaped liability, one released the emergency brake while the auto-
mobile was in reverse,' and the other entered an interscction against a
blinking red light.20 No attempt will be made to describe the facts of
these cases because "Every act of commission or omission which concerns
the accident must be considered ... .
Who Are Guests?
'lie Guest Statute requires proof of gross negligence by those
"transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest or
passenger without payment for such transportation." Each of the italicized
words gave rise to litigation.
The word "transported" was interpreted in Kaplan v. Taub,2 2 and in
LaRue v. HoIfIman.2 3 In Kaplan it was held that a plaintiff was a
transported guest when she had her hand on the handle of an open
automobile door and was about to enter the front seat. In La Rue, the
plaintiff was ruled a transported guest when she had alighted from the
automobile and was standing with both feet on the ground when hit by
an open door as the automobile went backwards.
14, 116 So.2d 16 (FHa. 1959).
15. Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, 116, 152 Eng. Rep. 737, 739 (1843).
16. Klem's, Inc. v. Cline, 105 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1958); Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So2d
889 (Fla. 1957); Hall v. Hlughey, 104 So.2d 849 (Fla. App. 1958).
17. Myers v. Korbly, 103 So.2d 215 (Fla. App. 1958); Madden v. Killinger, 97 So.2d
205 (Fla. App. 1957).
18. Budd v. Caswell, 100 So.2d 85 (Fla. App. 1958).
19. Kaplan v. Taub, 104 So.2d 882 (Fla. App. 1958).
20. Vihon v. McConnick, 109 So.2d 400 (Fla. App. 1958),cer. denied, 112 So.2d
9 (Fla. 1959).
21. -Hall v. Hughey, 104 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla. App. 1958).
22. 104 So.2d 882 (Fla. App. 1958).
23. 109 So.2d 373 (Fa. App. 1959).
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In a well reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that
an airplane is not a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the Florida
statute and that the statute does not apply to guests in airplanes.24
The opinion in Andrews v. Kirk25 has become a classic. The passenger,
fearing for her safety because of improper driving, demanded to be let
6ut of the automobile. The driver refused and thereafter failed to
negotiate a curve. The plaintiff's status on these facts was a question
of first impression in Florida. The opinion carefully analyzes every authority
and idea involved in the problem and holds that plaintiff's status as a
guest terminated after the refusal to let her out of the automobile. The
opinion's precision and refinement should guide the profession in the whole
area of creation and termination of the guest relationship where volition
and consent are involved.
Three cases involved the question of "payment." \Vhile a money
payment will satisfy the statute, the payment may take many other
forms. As stated in Sullivan v. Stock:26
. . . the guest statute does not apply when the transportation
is solely for the benefit of the owner or operator or mutual benefit
of the passenger and the owner or operator of the car; nor can
the guest statute be invoked in commercial transactions. . . .
In applying these principles, the Sullivan case held that one was not
a guest when he was riding with another to help the latter obtain a loan.
In Montana v. Gorp,2t a groom riding in a truck to care for his employer's
horse was held not to be a guest in an action against the defendant carrier.
Miller v. Morse Auto Rentals2 involved a complex situation. A
worked at home making pastries for B. At B's request, C, an agent of B,
took A shopping for pastry ingredients in an automobile rented from D.
C had an accident on the way back from the grocery. A sued C and D
and was held not to be a guest of either.
Farrey v. Betiendorf2  was the only case dealing with the school
child exception. It held that a high school student on the way home
from a night basketball game at the school's gm1nnasium was not within
the proviso ". . . that nothing in this section shall apply to school
children or other students being transported to or from schools or places
of learning in this state."
C. Care Required of Motorists
Automobile accidents provoked extensive litigation and relatively little
law. Although the basic rules of the road are prescribed by statutes and
24. Gridley v. Cardenas, 3 Wis.2d. 623, 89 N.V.2d 286 (1958).
25. 106 So.2d 110 (Fla. App. 1958).
26. 98 So.2d 507, 510 (Fla. App. 1957).
27. 108 So.2d 64 (Fla. App. 1959).
28. 106 So.2d 204 (Fla. App, 1958).
29. 96 So.2d 889 (Ma. 1957).
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ordinances, there are some important conuon law concepts at work on
the highway.
1. INTERSECTION ACCIDENTS
Intersections are either marked or unmarked. As to the latter, the
"rules" normally give the right-of-way to the first to enter, or the automobile
oil the right on simultaneous entry. :"' The only munarked intersection case
involved entry of both automobiles at 25 m.p.h. with neither driver seeing
the other until the instant before an almost dead-center collision. The
trial judge was affirmed in finding both drivers at fault and reversed
for not allowing the infant passengcrs of one to recover from the driver
of the other.A
The marked intersections produced a rash of litigation and an
amazingly large number of reversals. Trial judges were reversed in ten
out of fifteen cases where opinions were written. Fight of the ten reversals
were obtained by plaintiffs. Seven of the plaintiffs' eight reversals resulted
from refusals to let the jury decide the case,aa and the eighth was obtained
for refusal to set a defendant's jury verdict aside when plaintiff was stopped
at a light and hit broadside by the defendant. 33
Plaintiffs' verdicts were reversed in two cases. In one it was held
improper to charge on last clear chance in an oil truck-fire truck collision
at a controlled iutcrsection." In the other, a summary judgment for
plaintiff was reversed when lie was speeding on a through street and
hit defendants who had stopped at a stop sign and then entered the
intersection.
30. E.g. FLA. STAT. § 317.40 (1959).
31. Kokotoff v. lligman, 101 So.2d 166 (Fla. App. 1958).
32. LeFante v. Miami Air Conditioning Co., 11 So2d 725 (Fla. App. 1959)(plaintiff making left turn, hit the defendant on wrong side of road); Ringler v. McVeigh,
109 So.2d 606 (Fla. App. 1959) (jitney passenger on through street, defendant ran stop
sign); Vibon v. McCormick, 109 So.2d 400 (Ila. App. 1959) (passenger in automobile
that entered against red blinker, hit by speeding defendant that entered on yellow blinker);
Mason v. Remiek, 107 So.2d 38 (Fla. App. 1958) (plaintiff on favored street did not
look in defendant's direction, defendant ran a yield right-of-way sign); Erlacher v. Leonard
Bros. Transfer, 106 So.2d 201 (Fla. App. 1958) (plaintiff stopped for stop sign, then
pulled into intersection and stopped again, hit by truck that was passing an automobile
in a no-passing zone); Robbins v. Grace, 103 So.2d 658 (Fla. App. 1958) (plaintiff on
through street, defendant ran a stop sign); Bryant v. City of Tampa, 100 So.2d 665 (Fla.
App. 1958) (plaintiffs were passengers in an automobile which entered against a blinking
red light, hit by a speeding police automobile which entered on a blinking yellow light).
33. Ruth v. Sorenson, 104 So2d 10 (Fla, 1958).
34. Lee County Oil Co. v. Marshall, 98 So.2d 510 (Fla. App. 1957), cert. denied,
101 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1958).
35. Weber v. Porco, 100 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1958).
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Of the five intersection affirmances, one involved affirmance of a
plaintiff's verdict,"" and four involved approval of directed verdicts for
defendants."
Since nine out of sixteen intersection cases were reversed because
trial judges refused to let the juries decide them, Mr. Chief Justice Thomas'
observations in Jacksonville Coach Company v. Royals bear repeating:
Crossing collisions usually happen in circumstances that are
confusing because of the uncertainty of the testimony of witnesses
who see them, even though all may conscientiously report what
they think they saw. The present case is not unlike scores of
them that have reached this court. We cannot undertake to put
ourselves in the places of the jurors who decided that the appellant's
driver was negligent. The case was typically one for a jury and
we refrain from disturbing the judgment despite the plausibility
of the argument of appellant's counsel. . ..
Those looking for jury instruction material will find that the last
two years produced good statements on the favored motorist's right to
assume that others will obey traffic control devices,aa and that "a stop
sign is a proclanation of danger putting a duty on an approaching driver
to stop and look." 40
2. REAR-END COLLISIONS
Rear-end collisions produce relatively little liability litigation. The
stopped driver is usually as innocent as the striking driver is negligent.
Under McNulty v. Cusack,4' the plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict
unless the defendant comes forward with a satisfactory explanation for
failure to have his vehicle under control.
3. PEDESTRIANS-LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Every pedestrian case during the last two years was held to present
issues for jury determination. Nine cases raised liability questions and
36. Jacksonville Coach Co. v. Royal, 97 So.Zd 190 (Fla. 1957).
37. Spadaro v. Palmisano, 109 So.2d 418 (Fla. App. 1959) (defendant driving
lawfully on arterial highway, plaintiff passenger in automobile that entered against stop
sign); Stolmaker v. Bowermen, 100 So.2d 659 (Fla. App. 1958) (facts not stated);
Tackett v. llartack, 98 So.2d 896 (Fla. A pp. 1957) (plaintiff ran red light); Gilmer v.
Rubin, 98 So.2d 367 (Fla. App. 1957) (plaintiff hit by left-turning truck, no evidence
introduced as to truck driver's conduct except fact that he made a left turn).
38. 97 So.2d 190, 192 (Fla. 1957). Cf. Beit v. United States, 260 F.2d 386 (5th
Cir. 1958).
39. Mason v. Remick, 107 So.2d 38 (Fla. App. 1958); Robbins v. Grace, 103 So.Zd
658 (Fla. App. 1958); Tackett v. llartack, 98 So.2d 896 (Fla. App. 1957).
40. Robbins v. Grace. 103 So.2d 658, 661 (Fla. App. 1958).
41. 104 So.2d 785 (Fla. App. 1958). Followed in Cooper v. Yellow Cab Co., 106
So.2d 436 (Fla. App. 1958); Sheddon v. Yellow Cab Co. of Miami, 105 So.2d 388 (Fla.
App. 1958).
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resulted in affirmance of five jury verdicts4 2 reversal of three directed
verdicts, ,4 and reversal of one grant of a new trial. 44
When children are involved, the usual pedestrian law applied to
adults has little, if any, application. The various right-of-way ordinances
and "reciprocal rights" concepts give way to the increased protection which
the law affords children."' The guiding force in this area, as in countless
others, is the logic and huianity of Mr. Justice Terrell. His classic statement
in Miami Paper Co. v. Johnston,4" was quoted and applied in both Budgen
v. Brady47 and Coast Cities Coaches v. Donat.18 In the Budgen case the
court said:
. . The holding of our Supreme Court in Miami Paper Company
v. Johnston is indicative of the foregoing duty as applied to
children. *** In its well reasoned opinion by Mr. Justice Terrell,
the Court said: 'It is a matter of common knowledge that small
children are erratic and unpredictable, that they are liable to take
off at any time and in any direction with no concern whatever
for their own safety. The drivers of motor vehicles are charged
with knowledge of their behavior and are expected to govern
themselves accordingly when parking or driving about school
grounds, recreation parks, residential communities, trailer parks,
and other places inhabited by or frequented by children. They
are expected to anticipate children about such places and whether
or not they exercise reasonable care in doing so is a question for
the jury.' (Emphasis supplied.) This duty would appear doubly
imperative when, as in the instant case, the motorist leaves a
public thorough-fare and drives onto the private property of
another....
42. Mangan v. Amos, 98 So.2d 340 (Fla. 1957) (defendant's verdict affirmed; con-
tributorv negligence for jury where plaintiff started to cross on amber light, became
"rattled," ran in front of one car and finally jumped for curb and in front of defendant's
automobile); Noll v. Byorick, 108 So.2d 67 (Fla. App. 1959) (affirmed as to liability
without stating facts; new trial on damages only); Coast Cities Coaches v. Donat, 106
So.2d 593 (Fla. App. 1958) (plaintiff's verdict affirmed: child' in front of school bus run
over as bus started up after letting other children out); Budgen v. Brady, 103 So.2d 672
(Via, App.), cert. denied, 105 So.2d 793 (Fla. 1958) (plaintiff's verdict affirmed;
defendant turning around at dead-end, hit child in private driveway); Stegemann v. Hite,
96 So.2d 595 (Fla. App. 1957) (plaintiff's verdict affirmed, facts not given).
43. Ros6nfeld v. Knowlton, 110 So.2d 90 (Fla. App. 1959) (directed verdict forplaintiff reversed: discussed infra with last clear chance cases); Arnold v. Stevart. 101
So.2d 61 (Fla. App. 1958) (directed verdict for defendant reversed; plaintiff jaywalking,
was twenty-one feet into street when bit by motorcyclist); Sinitz v. Shapiro, 100 So.2d
458 (Fla. App. 1958) (directed verdict for defendant reversed; plaintiff on curb hit by
backing truck).
44. Wells v. Pope, 104 So.2d 858 (Fla. App. 1958) (new trial for defendant reversed;
driver hit child at uncontrolled intersection, evidence of speed and driver knew children
in area).
45. C. Washington v. Davis. 249 N.C. 65, 105 S.E.2d 202 (1958); Jones v. Wray,
169 Cal. App.2d 372, 337 P.2d 226 (1959).
46. 58 So.2d 869, 870 (Fla. 1952).
47. 103 So.2d 672, 675 (Fla. App. 1958).
48. 106 So.2d 593, 595 (Fla. App. 1958).
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Last Clear Chance
Eight of the ten last clear chance opinions involved pedestrians.'
Three of the decisions involved nighttime pedestrians hit from behind
while walking parallel to and on the edge of the road. All three cases
held the doctrine inapplicable. 0 The moral of these cases seems to be
"Safety is just a step away." However, pedestrians crossing the street may
soon find themselves at a driver's mercy. In Rosenfeld v. Knowlton,5'
the trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that the
defendant, as a matter of law, had a last clear chance. The plaintiff was
crossing at night anf had proceeded eight or nine feet when hit. The
case was reversed on appeal with a holding that last clear chance was a
jury question.
In Florida the doctrine does not require defendant's actual knowledge
of plaintiff's position of peril.52 Facts allowing an inference that the driver
"should have known" require submission of the issue to the jury. As always,
the problem comes in deciding what facts will support inferences that
the driver knew or should have known of plaintiff's peril and thereafter
had an opportunity to avoid the accident. The standard for resolving the
issue is well stated in Radtke v. Loud: "3
Where findings of fact compatible with the doctrine of last
clear chance are within the range of those permissible to be made
by the jury on the evidene, the court's charge should explain the
doctrine and authorize its consideration and application by the
jury dependent upon their findings establishing applicability ...
In applying the standard, the Radtke case went on to hold the trial
court erred in not charging on the doctrine when a school patrolman
directig traffic at an intersection was hit by defendant who knew plaintiff
was there and saw him step backwards into defendant's lane of travel.
In several cases it was held that there was no evidence to warrant
a charge on the doctrine. Lee County Oil Company v. Marshall4 involved
a reversal for giving the charge in a fire truck-oil truck intersection collision.
The plaintiff was a fireman riding on the tail gate of the fire truck and
was not chargeable with contributory negligence. lI addition, there was
no evidence that the oil truck driver could have seen the fire truck in
49. Two cases involved two-vehicle collisions. Parker v. Perfection Co-op. Dairies,
102 So.2d 645 (Fla. App. 1958); Lee County Oil Co. v, Marshall, 98 So.2d 510 (Fla.
App. 1957), cert. denied, 101 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1958).
50. Cavitt v. Ferris. 269 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1959) (charge erroneously given); Falnes
v. Kaplan, 101 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1958) (charge properly denied); Edwards v. Donaldson,
103 So.2d 256 (Fla. App. 1958) (charge properly denied).
51. 110 So.2d 90 (Fla. App. 1959).
52. E.g., Springer v. Morris, 74 So.2d 781 (la. 1954); Wawner v. Slellic Stone
Studio, 74 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1954); Royal Kitchen Cabinet Corp. v. Palcic, IlI So.2d 42
(Fla. App. 1959).
53. 98 So.2d 891, 894 (Fla. App. 1957).
54. 98 So.2d 510 (Fla. App. 1957), cert. denied, 101 So.2d 819 (Fla. 1958).
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time to avoid the accident. In Gordon v. Cozart, ' the giving of the
charge was reversed where a nighttime pedestrian was "scurrying" across
a highway in a fog and was hit by defendant. The court found no evidence
that "defendant did see, or with the employment of due care, should
have seen the decedent in time to avoid the accident." In O'Neal v.
Lahnala,0 it was held proper to refuse a last clear chance charge where the
plaintiff suddenly left a position of safety at the edge of the road and
took two or three quick steps into the path of the defendant's automobile.
In the Palcic case,"7 the doctrine was applied when the driver said
he did not, but the evidence showed he could have seen a child bicyclist
near the edge of the roadway. The opinion states that the last clear
chance doctrine is not an "exception" to general contributory doctrine,
"but rather permits a recovery based upon defendant's (later) negligence
being the proximate cause of the injury."
4. OTHER NEGLIGENT OPERATION
While intersections and pedestrians accounted for most of the auto-
mobile decisions, there were a number of cases involving miscellaneous
phases of automobile law.
Negligent parking was involved in two cases and produced two
reversals for refusal to let the jury decide the negligence and proximate
cause issues."
Negligence in passing was also involved in two cases. In one,5" a truck
made a left turn as an automobile tried to pass it. The jury found for
the truck driver defendant and against both the husband and wife in
the automobile. The trial judge was reversed for granting the wife
passenger a new trial since there was evidence to support a finding that
the truck driver had signaled his intention to turn for about 500 feet.
In the other passing'case,6 0 a passenger sued his speeding driver who
hit a truck improperly turning left from the right lane. The jury found
for plaintiff and the trial judge granted a new trial, believing he erred
in refusing to charge that the defendant was not liable if the truck had
made an improper turn. The granting of the new trial was reversed with
a good analysis of concurrent negligence and the fact that there can be
more than one proximate cause of an accident.
55. 110 So.2d 75 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 114 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1959).
56. 253 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1958).
57. Royal Kitchen Cabinet Corp. v. Palcic, 111 So.2d 42, 43 (Fla. App. 1959).
58. Farrey v. Bettendorf, 96 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1957) (motor scooter ran into rear of
parked automobile; scooter passenger sued owner of automobile parked More than twelve
inches from curb; summary judgment for automobile owner reversed); Mazak v. Rowe,
112 So.2d 57 (Fla. App. 1959) (suit by passenger in automobile that ran into city trash
truck illegally parked in intersection; judgment on pleadings for city reversed).
59. Jordan Furniture Co. V. Goggans, 101 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1958).
60. De La Concha v. Pinero, 104 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1958).
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In Good v. Ozer,"' the defendant suddenly pulled out from a parked
position and into the side of plaintiff's automobile which was proceeding
in a lane adjacent to a row of parked automobiles. A directed verdict for
the defendant was reversed with a good discussion of the "very high
degree of care" owed by parked motorists pulling into the flow of trhffic
and the "helpless" plight of those moving in the stream of traffic.
Jacksonville Journal Company v. Gilreath 2 involved a panel truck
driver carrying three teen-aged paper boys. It was dark and the truck
was partitioned so that the driver could not see the boys. At the time
of the accident the plaintiff was trying to reinsert a loose tail gate pin.
The truck started up suddenly without any warning and threw plaintiff
to the pavement. A jury verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed with an
opinion emphasizing the duty of care owed to a "lively group of youngsters."
There were two accidents involving defective streets. In one," the
plaintiff was held contributorily negligent when he hit an elevated nanhole
which he saw twenty-five feet away. The plaintiff knew the street was
under repair "but elected to risk driving over" the manhole. In the other
accident, a passenger's verdict against a road contractor was affirmed when
the contractor had failed to give adequate warning of an eight inch
drop off.64
On the question of speed limits, Gordon v. Cozart '5 is an extremely
important decision. The state statute 6 sets a 25 m.p.h. limit in a "business
or residence district." These terms arc defined as follows:
Business District"7  Residence District s
The territory contiguous The territory contiguous
to, and including, a highway to, and including, a highway
when fifty per cent or more not comprising a business dis-
of the frontage thereon, for triet when the property on
a distance of three hundred such highway, for a distance
feet or more, is occupied by of three hundred feet or
buildings in use for business, more, is in the main improved
with residence or residences
and buildings in use for
business.
61. 100 So,2d 204 (Fla. App. 1958).
62. 104 So.2d 865 (Ia. App. 1958).
63. Finkelstein v. Brooks Paving, Co., 107 So.2d 205 (Fla. App. 1958).
64. M. J. Carroll Contracting Co. v. Pine, 103 So.2d 685,(Fla. App. 1958). The
driver in this accident recovered a verdict which was affirmed with an additional holding
that contributory negligence was also a jury question. NI. 1. Carroll Contracting Co. v.
Brown, 104 So.2d 470 (Fla. App. 1958).
65. 110 So.2d 75 (Fla. App.), cert.'denied, 114 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1959):
66. FLA. STAT. § 317.22 (1959).
67. FLA. STAT. § 317.01(3) (1959).
68. FLA. STAT. § 317.01(19) (1959).
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The issue in the Gordon case was whether the area was a residence
district or open highway. The case noted that 50% of the frontage must
be occupied by buildings in use for business to constitute a business
district; whereas the "residence district" definition does not refer to frontage
and substitutes "iii the main" for 50%. 'rite evidence was conflicting
as to the number and location of the buildings and dwellings and the
speed limit issue was held properly submitted to the jury.
In Wallace v. Taxicabs of Tampa, Inc.,6 1' the court had to determine
whether a local ordinance prohibiting passing at intersections applied to
a four-runed street. The opinion analyzed the cases from many jurisdictions
and reached the sensible conclusion that such passing is proper. Both the
Wallace opinion and the cases collected therein note that a contrary ruling
would bring traffic to a standstill and defeat the whole purpose of multi-
lane highways.
5. corFRIB1UTORY NEeLICENCE
-lerc were a number of decisions involving contributory negligence
issues peculiar to automobile cases. Tile conduct of a reasonably prudent
passenger was explored in Hufftian v. PeekY114 The rule that a passenger
can trust the vigilance and skill of his driver until on notice to the contrary
was reaffirmed with a holding that the issue was for the jury on the factsjl
The Radike case 2 held the trial judge erred in failing to charge on
the "street worker" doctrine. Those required to work in the street must be
judged by a more relaxed standard of care than those merely using the
streets for travel. The plaintiff was a school patrolman directing traffic at
an intersection.
On the question of imputed contributory negligence, the only persons
penalized for another's conduct were automobile owners who were charged
with their drivers' negligenCe.1 Absent ownership or a joint enterprise,
negligence of a driver is not imputed to a passenger;74 ncgligence of a
husband is not imputed to his wife;7" and negligence of a father is not
imputed to his children. 70 The Bryant ease 77 discusses the joint enterprise
doctrine at length and notes that there is no joint enterprise unless there
is both a common purpose and common control of the car.
69. 112 So.2d 574 (Fla. App. 1959).
70. 102 So.2d 641 (Fla. App. 1958).
71. Plaintiff's nineteen year old son-in-law ran into the rear of a parked truck while
going too fast in heavy fog and smoke.
72. 98 So.2d 891 (Fla. App. 1957).
73. Weber v. Porco, 100 So.2d 146 (Fb. 1958); followed in Cnlick v. Whitaker,
102 So.2d 847 (Fla, App. 1958).
74. M. J. Carroll Contracting Co. v. Pine. 103 So.2d 685 (Fla. App. 1958); Bryant
v. City of Tampa, 100 So.2d 665 (Fla. App. 1958).
75. Jordan Furniture Co. v. Goggans, 101 So.2d 114 (FIa. 1958).
76. Kokotoff v. ilignian, 101 So.2d 166 (Pla. App, 1958).
77. See note 74 supra.
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11. STATUTORY LIABILITY
Lawyers are so imbued with common law concepts in the personal injury
area that they are prone to overlook the existence or significance of
applicable statutes or ordinances. The importance of such legislation is shown
in Tamiani Gun Shop v. Klein." The defendant sold a rifle to a boy
under seventeen. While the minor was riding in a car, the car hit a hole in
the road; the rifle accidentally discharged, and the boy's thumb and hand
were injured. The boy sued the defendant gun shop and obtained a summry
judgment oii liability which was affirmed on appeal. Sale of a rifle to a
minor under seventeen violated both a state statute79 and a local ordinance
and the court held the sale constituted negligence as a matter of law.
Likewise, the sale was held the proximate cause of the injury as a matter
of law. Finally, it was held that contributory negligence was no defense
in the case.
The extent of Klein's future application remains to be seen. It is the
writer's belief that the' law announced only applies to legislation designed
to protect those the legislature has found unable to exercise adequate care
for thclmselvcs. The opinion, as written, expressly so limits the holding.
In addition to the Klein case, statutory liability issues also arose in
cases involving dog owners, railroad operation, and the Jones 80 and Federal
Employers' Liability Acts. 1
A. Dog Owner's Liability
Sections 767.01 and 767.04 of the Florida Statutes deal with dog
owner's liability. The latter section only applies to clog bite cases and
provides that "provocation" is a defense. The former section is not limited
to dog bite cases and imposes liability on dog owners "for any damage
done by their dogs." However, the section is silent as to what, if any,
defenses are available. In Vandercar v. David,82 the plaintiff was knocked
down by a dog and the case was governed by section 767.01. The court held
that under section 767.01 the defendant may defend by showing that the
plaintiff "unnecessarily and voluntarily puts himself in the way to be hurt,
knowing the probable consequences."
In Knight v. Burghduff,83 the plaintiff was bitten by a dog while
lawfully on the owner's property. The owner was held liable under section
767.04 for failing to have a "bad dog" sign on the premises cven though
the plaintiff had actual knowledge that the dog was vicious.
78. 109 So.2d 189 (la. App.), cert. discharged with opinion, 116 So.2d 421 (Fla.
1959).
79. FLA. STAT. § 790.18 (1959).
80. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
81. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
82. 96 So.2d 227 (Pl. App. 1957).
83. 102 So.2d 617 (Pla. 1958). The facts and holding are taken from the dissenting
opinion.
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B. Railroad Operation
Railroad crossing accidents under sections 768.05 - 768.06 of tile Florida
Statutes were involved in nine cases. In one,84 a judgment against the
railroad was reversed because of jury instructions requiring the railroad to
prove itself free from negligence. In the other eight cases, liability was held
a jury question seven times,85  and in one case8" it was held that the railroad
was entitled to a directed verdict.
The Cutchins case87 decided an important issue. Under section 768.06,
comparative negligence is substituted for contributory negligence in actions
against a railroad; but contributor\ negligence is a complete defense as to
individual railroad employees joined as defendants. Consequently, a jury
can find against the railroad and for the railroad employee even though
the railroad's liability is based exclusively on the employee's negligence.
In the Branham case,"8 the plaintiff was urinating between two cars
in a railroad yard when the engineer backed a train from a third of a mile
away. The plaintiff lost both legs and recovered a verdict under the law
requiring railroads to exercise reasonable care towards persons whose presence
is foreseeable. T'he accident occurred near a path and "the general public
had walked through, in and about the yard for many years." The railroad
gave no warning of the movement and had no employee at the rear of the
train.
84. Butler v. Cone Bros. Contracting Co., Ill So.2d 454 (Fla. App. 1959).
85. Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 112 So.2d 263 (Fla. 1959) (43 m.p.h.
at unprotected and obstructed crossing in Winter Park; conflict as to signals); Cntchins
v. Seaboard Air Line R. R. Co., 101 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1958) (facts not detailed); Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Bracewell, 110 So.2d 482 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 113 So.2d
835 (Fla. 1959) (negligence of railroad fireman, not specified); Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
Co. v. Boone, 108 So.2d 635 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 113 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1959) (facts
not given); Leslie v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 103 So.2d 645 (Fla. App. 1958) (70
m.p.h. at crossing in yards of soap company, obstructed by parked railroad cars; conflict
as to signals); Martin v. Makris, 101 So.2d 172 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 104 So.2d 595
(Fla. 1958) (75 m.p.h. in North Miami Beach; automatic gates and signals system acti-
vated too late); Martin v. Rivera, 99 So.2d 617 (Fla. App. 1957) (seldom used spur
track, obstructed by brush and pine trees, conflict as to when and where signals given).
Cf. Bush v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co.. 260 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1958).
86. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Connel. 110 So.2d 80 (11a. App.), cert. denied,
115 So.2d 560 (Fla. 1959) (unprotected and unobstructed crossing in Tampa; train going
three-four m.p.h. giving signals with headlight on; driver of plaintiff's automobile passed
truck which had slowed or stopped for train).
87. Cutchins v. Seaboard Airline R. R. Co., 101 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1958). In Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bracewell, 110 So.2d 482 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 113 So.2d
835 (Fla. 1959), the jury found against the railroad and for the engineer even though
contributory negligence was not raised as a defense. Judgment against the railroad was
affirmed because of evidence that the fireman was also negligent. In Kirkpatrick v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.K. Co., 259 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1958), the court held that a trial judge
can submit the comparative negligence issue to the jury along with a charge that plaintiff
was guilt of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
88. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Branham, 99 So.2d 621 (Fla. App.), cert. dis-
charged, 104 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1958).
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C. Jones and Federal Employers' Liability Acts
The Jones89 and Federal Employers' Liability9 Acts produced con-
siderable litigation in the Florida courts. There were six FELA cases.
Five9"' dealt with the judge-jury relation and produced five holdings that
the railroad's liability was a jury question tinder the liberal federal rule of
liability if "employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in
producing the injury or death for which damages are sought."92
One case 93 held that the provisions of the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C.
Sec. 151 ct seq.] precluded the plaintiff from claiming that the railroad was
negligent in requiring him to submit to a "field test" for the alleged
purpose of determining his physical fitness.
In the only case under the Joncs Act, 4 it was held that a Cuban
injured in Jamaican waters on a Panamanian ship was not a "seaman"
within the meaning of the Act although the shipping articles were signed
in Miami.
111. COMMON LAw NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
A major portion of common law negligence litigation centers around
the duty of care owed plaintiff by defendant. The relationship between
the parties often controls the outcome of the case. For this reason, the
common law cases are collected according to the relationships involved.
A. Landlord and Tenant
Landlord and tenant law is built around "exceptions" to the general
rule of no landlord liability after a lease of the premises. However it is
questionable which covers the most territory-the exceptions or the rule.
The supreme court's decision in Propper v. Kesner" deals with two
important cxceptions and is a masterpicce of fine legal writing and thinking.
A tenant, having trouble with a gas stove, reported the difficulty to the
landlord in accordance with the landlord's instructions to do so. The landlord
told the tenant the stove was in good condition which proved not to be
- 89. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
90. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1958).
91. Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Misak, 102 So.2d 295 (Fla. 1958) (switchman hit
by train of cars; co-employee improperly gave engineer signal to move train); Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Barrett, 101 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1958) (car inspector hurt during
switching operation; cars kicked back too fast); Martin v. Tindel], 98 So.2d 473 (Fla.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 959 (1958) (slip and fall in tavern car aisle; wet from
leakv air conditioner); Combs v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 112 So.2d 855 (Fla. App.
1959) (facts not stated); Connor v. Butler, 109 So2d 183 (Fla. App.), rev'd, 361 U.S.
29 (1959), opinion on remand, 116 So.2d 454 (Fla. App. 1959) (hose cutter bit on hand
by falling door of platform steps on passenger car).
92. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957).
93, Butler v. Smith, 104 So.2d 868 (Fla. App. 1958),
94. Corella v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 101 So.2d 903 (Fla. App. 1958).
95. 104 So.2d I (Fla. 1958).
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the case as it exploded two minutes after it was lit. A directed verdict
for the landlord was reversed on two grounds, one of which was a question
of first impression in Florida. The case squarely holds that a landlord's
negligent failure to repair as promised creates liability for injuries caused
by such nonperformance.9 1 Negligence in making repairs has always been
considered a basis of liability,"7 but the Propper case is the first case
imposing liability for nonfeasance.
The Propper case also contains a holding that liability was a jury
question because of evidence"" that the landlord reserved control over the
gas stove. The basic reason for the rule of non-liability is that the landlord
surrenders control and the ability to repair when the leasing occurs.
When control is retained, liability is retained along with it.
In City of Daytona Beach v. Baker" ' an exploding water tank injured a
beauty contestant in defendant's auditorium which had been leased to a
civic group for the "Miss Florida" contest. The court found no evidence
that the defendant had reserved control over the auditorium or the
water tank which was a stage prop.
In Roth v. Florn, "I' the court apparently held that a social visitor
of a tenant is a licensee as to the landlord. The injury occurred during
a fall on a sidewalk which apparently was under the landlord's control.
This holding has little logic and virtually no authority to support it.
The Restatement of Tortst lt requires landlords to exercise reasonable care
towards guests of tenants as to any injuries occurring on a part of the
premises retained in the lessor's control. The Roth case appears to hold
contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority in this country 02 and
cites io cases in point to support its conclusion. The case probably will
not stand up under attack since the court was apparently unaware of the
multitude of authority to the contrary.
96. This holding is following in Wallace v. Schrier, 107 So.2d 754 (Fla. App. 1958)
(promise and failure to repair defective linoleum on kitchen floor); Wiley v. Dow, 107
So,2d 166 (Fla. App. 1958) (promise and failure to repair rotten steps); cf. Perlman
v. Kraemer, 104 So.2d 609 (Fla. App. 1958) (tenant assumed risk of falling plaster but
opinion touches on failure to repair and control of overhead plumbing); The Propper rule
was recognized but held inapplicable in Moore v. O'Connor, 106 So.2d 606 (Fla. App.
1958), where there was a duty to repair but no negligence in not discovering rotten ban-
nister.
97. E.g., Felshin v. Sir, 149 Fa. 218, 5 So2d 600 (1942).
98. The tenants were told not to attempt repairs but to report all defects to the
landlord. In addition, the tenant in question was instructed as to how to light the burner.
99. 98 So.2d 804 (Fla. App. 1957), cert. denied, 105 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1958). The
same law was applied in Baum v. Freeman, 103 So.2d 654 (Fli. App. 1958), when the
tenant's wife fell when a rug slipped on a terrazzo floor. There was no allegation of the
landlord's reservation of control and an order dismssming the complaint was affirmed.
100. 105 So.2d 179 (Fla. App. 1958).
101. RESTATEM ENT, TORTS § 360 (1934). Common passageways, like that involved in
Buck v. Hardy, 106 So.2d 428 (Fbi. App. 1958), are necessarily retained in the landlord's
control for the use of all tenants.
102. E.g., 32 Am. ]1Ri. Landlord and 'Tenlant § 684 (1941); PRossFrs, Tours § 80
(2d ed. 1955); Wool v. Lamer, 112 Vt. 431, 26 A.2d 89 (1942).
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B. Common Carriers
The relationship of common carrier and passenger calls into play some
of the highest duties of care which exist at common law. The passenger
has practically nothing to say about operation of the vehicle, and carrier
accidents usually do not involve contributory negligence as a defense. This
fact coupled with the rule that carriers must exercise the highest degree
of care requires a verdict for the passenger against someone in most motor
vehicle accident cases.
When a taxi or jitney passenger is injured in a collision and sues all
the vehicles involved, lie is entitled to a charge that he must recover a
verdict from someone and it is up to the jury to decide which of the
defendants are liable.'03
In Beers v. Diamond Cabs,"" a slow moving taxi and a fast moving
truck collided at an unmarked and unobstructed intersection. The truck
was the vehicle on the right and the cab entered the intersection first.
A directed verdict for the taxi company and against the passenger was
reversed with a statement that "plaintiff only had to prove a slight breach
from the highest degree of care to raise a prima facie case."
One case"* held a carrier "owes the same high degree of care to
passengers when entering or leaving the vehicle as when being transported
therein." And, in another decision, 06 the rule that an alighting passenger
must exercise reasonable care for her own safety was recognized, but the
case was reversed for charging on contributory negligence when there was
no evidence of any.
C. Distribution of Electricity
Electrical injury cases warrant separate classification because of the
high degree of care imposed on those dealing with electricity.1 7 In addition,
electrical cases often involve experts testifying in a world of their own.
The Willis case' 05 contains an important holding that compliance by
a defendant with the minimum standards of "the National Electrical
Safety Code is a factor which may be considered by a jury in determining
the issue of negligence, but it is not in itself a defense to the action."
The case reversed a plaintiff's verdict for lack of evidence as to how or
103. New Deal Cab Co. v. Stubbs, 90 So.2d 614 (Fla. 1956); Ringler v. McVeigh,
109 So.2d 606 (Fla. App. 1959).
104. 104 So.2d 388 (Fla. App. 1958). The extent to which carriers must foresee and
guard against improper conduct of others is graphically illustrated in Bullock v. Tamiami
Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959).
105. Pividal v. City of Miami, 105 So.2d 502 (Fla. App. 1958).
106. Thomason v. Miami Transit Co., 100 So.2d 620 (Fla. 1958) (bus driver closed
manually operated door on alighting passenger).
107. E.g., Richmond v. Florida Power & Light Co., 58 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1952);
Escanbia County Electric Light & Power Co. v. Sutherland, 61 la. 167, 55 So. 83
(1911).
108. Florida Power Corp. v. Willis, 112 So.2d 15, 17 (Fla. App.), crt, denied, 115
So.2d 416 (Fla. 1959).
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in what manner plaintiff received the electrical shock which injured him.
On the negligence issue, the opinion contains an excellent discussion of
a power company's duty to maintain uninsulated wires at heights which
take into account the use of the property below. Maintenance of wires
twenty-four feet above farm land where 20-40 foot lengths of irrigation
pipe are sometimes raised in the air was held to create a jury question
as to negligence.
On the issue of height, it was held in one case' 09 that maintenance
of high tension wires at an unspecified height over water at Tavernier
Creek was not, as a matter of law, negligence which was a proximate
cause of injury to a fishing mate who raised alurninum outriggers into them.
In Bell v. Florida Power 6 Light Company, l " a construction worker
was killed when a crane contacted a power line. A directed verdict for
defentlants was reversed because of a failure to de-energize the line as
promised.
In another crane-power line case,"' a summary judgment for the
power company was reversed when a bucket-man was burned while pouring
concrete on the top of a wall. The power line was about a foot outside
the power company's easement and there was opinion evidence that this
was a departure from sound electrical engineering practice.
D. Doctor-Patient
Doctor-patient litigation involves special problems. On the one hand,
a doctor is probably hurt more by being sued than anyone else. On the
other hand, medical ineptness can cause death or extreme injury to persons
who can expect virtually no help from the medical profession in proving
a case which often requires expert medical testimony.
Florida law now requires a doctor to defend on his conduct rather than
his reputation. It is reversible error to charge the jury that a doctor's
reputation is at stake in a malpractice case.' -12
There were a number of important decisions on the question of
whcn the plaintiff needs expert testimony to get to the jury. WVhen the
issue is one of proper diagnosis or acceptable method of treatment, expert
testimony is usually required since lay jurors are not qualified to judge
such matters.'' On the other hand, the expert testimony requirement
109. Dudding v. Florida Keys Elec. Co-op. Ass'n, 105 So.2d 597 (Fla. App. 1958).
110. 106 So.2d 224 (Fla. App. 1958), cert. discharged, 113 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1959).
11. Palov v. Florida Power & Light Co., 107 So.2d 780 (Fla. App. 1958).
112. Stauf v. Holden, 94 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1957).
113. Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So.2d 307 (Fla. App. 1958) (summary judgment for
obstetrician affirmed; failure to diagnose pregnancy; no expert testimony that doctor failed
to follow accepted diagnostic methods). Compare, however, Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99
So.2d 575 (Fla. 1957), where an unconscious man died of broken ribs which punctured
his chest cavity after the police and hospital diagnosed him as a drunk and "deposited"
him on a jail cot with no medical treatment. A directed verdict for defendant hospital
was reversed.
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is relaxed substantially when the question is negligence "in the application
or administration of an approved medical treatment." The Atkins case"'
drew this distinction and reversed a summary judgment when there was
evidence that a child developed a Volkmann's Contracture (claw hand)
from negligence in improperly applying a plaster cast to a broken arm
and negligence in failing to bi-valve the cast after "classic warnings" that
it was necessary. The case also stated that expert testimony was not needed
on the causation issue.
The supreme court's reversal of the Second District Court of Appeal
in the Atkins case also casts considerable doubt on the validity of two
other'Second District opinions. Both decisions'' 5 found no liability against
hospitals as a matter of law when elderly patients suffering from heart
attacks were left unattended and without bed-rails. These opinions proceed
on the assumption that only experts can establish the need for bed-rails, and
the Atkins case points strongly in the other direction.
In Dohr v. Smith,"6 a patient who had undergone a gastic resection
was found to have a false tooth in her right bronchus. The tooth was
knocked there by an anesthetist using a laryngoscope. It was held that
expert testimony was unnecessary as to the anesthetist's negligence and
a directed verdict for her was reversed. The surgeon involved and the
hospital were held free from fault. Mr. justice Terrell's dissent as to the
surgeon's exoneration has considerable merit since the surgeon knew of
the missing tooth, knew the patient had a cough, suggested no x-rays,
and told the patient not to worry about it. However, the majority held that
expert testimony was required to evaluate the surgeon's conduct and there
was none.
A doctor's duty of care was stated as follows in Crovella v. Cochrane:"7
There is no fixed criterion by which to mark the dividing
line between the degree of care that must be exercised by those
who engage as specialists in the several branches or fields of
medicine as compared to the general practitioners. Neither insures
the correctness of his diagnosis. Generally, it is the duty of each
to apply to the diagnosis and treatment of his patient the skills,
means, and methods that are recognized as necessary to be
followed in the particular case according to the standards of those
who are qualified by training and experience to perform similar
services in the community ...
There were two decisions involving unauthorized treatment and in
both it was held that the evidence was for the jury on a theory of "assault"
114. Atkins v. lurnes, 110 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1959), reversing the Second District Court
of Appeal's decision in 107 So.2d 253 (Fla. App. 1958).
115. Marsh v. City of St. Petersburg, 106 So.2d 567 (Fla. App. 1958); Memorial
Hosp., South Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Doring, 106 So.2d 565 (Fla. App. 1958).
116, 104 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1958).
117, 102 So.2d 307, 311 (Fla. App. 1958).
1960]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
or trespass to the person as distinguished fron malpractice. In one, 18S an
appendectomy was performed under an unauthorized spinal anesthetic. The
doctor was held liable for paralysis of one lcg caused by the spinal
anesthetic. Tei case contains a fine treatment of the law on implied consent
and collects the authorities dealing with a doctor's rights in an emergency
when consent cannot be obtained. The case was followed in a subsequent
decision"" when a patient went in for a hernia operation and an unauthor-
ized aortagran 2 -' 1 was performed with resulting paralysis of the lower
extremities.
On the statute of limitations issue, it was held in Manning v.
Serrano"'' that a plaintiff has four years in which to sue for malpractice
sounding in tort, and that section 95.11(5)(c) of the Florida Statutes
allowing three years only applies if the complaint sounds in contract.
E. Manufacturers and Suppliers
A great moving force in the common law is 1nan's inner conviction
that one who negligently injures the innocent should pay for the damages
caused. Man's sense of justice revolts at any rule producing a contrary
result. The early rules insulating manufacturers and contractors from
liability have not withstood the passage of time.
Florida made significant advances in this field in the past two years.
Each step was guided by these inner convictions of right and justice.
Floridians can take a full measure of pride in the superb opinions of
Justices Drew and Thornal in the Slavin' ' and \Vaitl2 S cases.
In the Slavin case, a wash basin came loose from the wall and
injured a motel guest because of a latent defect in installation. The motel
owner was held not liable because of no evidence of negligence in failing
to discover the defect. The plumbing contractor's liability was held to
present a jury question. The ancient rule absolving contractors from
liability after completion was subjected to careful analysis and then
rejected in important respects. Since the rule was bottomed on shifting
responsibility to the owner, the opinion rejects the rule when latent defects
not-discoverable by the owner are involved. The opinion likewise rejects the
requirement of an "inherently dangerous" condition. Under Slavin, the
innocent victim recovers from the owner when the owner is at fault and from
the contractor when the owner is blameless. As the opinion aptly observes:
118. Chambers v. Nottebaum, 96 So.2d 716 (Fla. App. 1957).
119. 7aretzky v. Jacobson, 99 So.2d 730 (Fla. App. 1958).
120. An adrtagram is described in the opinion as a "highly technical and dangerous
operation" where a large needle is inserted "into the skin at the tip of one of the
appellant's ribs for the purpose of entering the aorta." Zaretsky v. Jacobson, supra note
119 at 731.
121. 97 Sn.2d 688 (Fla. 1957).
122. Slavin v. Kay, 108 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1959).
123. Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1958).
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To hold otherwise would result necessarily in the anomaly
of fault without liability and wrong without a remedy, contrary
not only to our sense of justice but directly conflicting with the
express mandate of the Florida Constitution, Declaration of
Rights, Section 4, F.S.A., that 'every person for any injury done
him *** shall have remedy ***'.. .. 124
In the Wait case, the plaintiff's husband died after inhaling carbon
tetrachloride fumes while cleaning floors. The defendant drug company
sold and distributed the carbon tetrachloride. A jury finding of negligence
because of inadequate warning of the product's extreme dangers was
affirmecl. Ilie opinion contains a full discussion of a distributor's liability
for negligence and of the duty to warn according to the dangers involved.
The requirement of privity as a basis for tort liability is expressly rejected.
In Rawls v. Ziegler,25 the court divided 4-3 on an issue regarding
foresceability of intervening forces but was in substantial agreement on some
important products liability questions. There was agreement on the
principle that an independent contractor who does work according to plans
and specifications supplied is not liable unless the plans are so obviously
dangerous that no reasonable man would follow them. Likewise, there
was substantial agreement that a supplier (truck dealer selling truck with
specially modified body) was under the same duty of care as a manu-
facturer irrespective of any privity.
F. Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers
W/hen plaintiff is injured on defendant's property, the purpose and
circumstances of the entry determine the defendant's common law duty
of care. The entire scope of the problem is examined in McNulty v.
I-urley1' 1 which holds that a parishioner attending mass is a licensee.
The opinion establishes a "benefit" to defendant as the dividing line
between invitces and licensees and reasons that one engaged in worship
benefits only himself. Dicta in the opinion states that a financial contri-
bution would not alter the plaintiff's status as it is the giver -who benefits
thereby.
The principles established in the McNulty case were applied in 'Wallace
v. Boca Raton Properties27 where it was held that a sportswriter covering
a golf tournament was an invitce of the tournament sponsor since his
presence was for the mutual benefit of both parties.
In the Lancaster case,128 the plaintiff was a guest in a car which
entered defendant's private driveway by mistake and collided with defendant's
124. Slavin v. Kay, supra note 122 at 467.
125. 107 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1958).
126. 97 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1957).
127. 99 So.2d 637 (Fla. App. 1958).
128. Lancaster v. Orlando Funeral Home, 100 So.2d 90 (Fla. App. 1958). Comparel
Margrabe v. Craves, 97 So.2d 498 (Fla. App. 1957).
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automobile. The plaintiff was held to be a licensee or a trespasser with
110 right of recovery in either cvcnt.
The liability of swimming pool owners was considered in Adler v.
Copeland.2'1 A five-year old girl drowned in the defendant's pool. The
girl was playing with defendant's children and defendant had given the
child a toy to play with. It was held that the child was a licensee, but a
directed verdict for the defendant was reversed with a holding that a jury
could find willful and wanton negligence when defendant left the home
after telling the children not to go near the pool. The case turns on the
amount of care required and the dangers involved with children of tender
years.
The Adler case also has a holding concerning the "attractive nuisance
doctrine." Under this doctrine, a duty of reasonable care is owed to
children attracted to the premises by conditions which present unusual
elements of danger not appreciated by them. The case holds that a fenced
in swimming pool with no hidden dangers does not come within the
doctrine.
There were three other attractive nuisance cases. In two,: ' recoveries
were affirmed in rockpit drowning cases involving unusual elements of
danger. In the third,"-" a building under construction was held not to
come within the doctrine on the facts.
G. Care Owed Invitees
Injuries to invitees produced mnore litigation than any other type
of case. While the bulk of the cases involved falls, there were a number
of cases involving other types of accidents.
1. INJURIES NOT INVOLVING FALLS
A defendant owes invitces on his premises a duty of reasonable care
for their safety and protection. In applying this rule, the evidence was
held to create jury questions when: a motel guest was swimming and
hit by a boy thrown in the pool during horseplay;';- a boy lost control
of a scooter because of loose gravel and holes on the approach to a
supermarket parking lot;' '8 a man was hit by a golf scoreboard blown
over by wind;" 4 a hotel guest walked through an unmarked glass
129. 105 So.2d 594 (Fla. App. 1958).
130. Larnel Builders v. Martin, 105 So.2d 580 (Fla. App. 1958), cert. discharged,
110 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1959); Ansin v. Thurston, 98 So.2d 87 (Fla. App. 1957), cert.
denried, 101 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1958).
131. Miller v. Guernsey Constr. Co., 112 So.2d 55 (Fla. App. 1959).
132. Gordon v. Hotel Seville, 105 So.2d 175 (Fla. App. 1958), cert. denied, 109
So.2d 767 (Fla. 1959).
133. Shields v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc., 106 So2d 90 (Fla. App. 1958), cert.
denied, 109 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1959).
134. Vallace v. Boca Raton Properties, 99 So.2d 637 (Fla. App. 1958).
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panel;" a boy, whose parents were looking at a model home, walked
into a glass door;'36 a woman was knocked down by a crowd rushing in a
store during a sale after defendant opened the doors and shouted "GO"; 1"7
a caddy was hit by a golf ball;138 and a movie goer was injured when a
lady's lounge chair collapsed. 1 19
The evidence was held insufficient to go to the jury when: a motel
guest sat in a chair which had a rusty nail exposed; 146 a man walked
through a glass panel adjacent to a door141 and a shopper was hit by a
swinging door marked "Caution! Door Swings Out" opened by persons
unknown.142
The Shields case' 4' deserves comment. The accident occurred on the
shoulder of a road on an approach to the defendant's property. It was
held that a defendant must not only use due care to provide safe premises,
but also, the duty may extend to "approaches to the premises" which are
open to invitees and so located as to invite their use.
The Mosqueda case' 44 is also important since it discusses the special
and higher duty of care owed by amusement operators. While they are
not insurers, they owe "a higher degree of diligence than is required of
stores, banks, and other places of business."' 45
2. SLIP, TRIP AND FALL
There were thirty cases where defendants owed falling plaintiffs a duty
of reasonable care. The cases split 17-13 in favor of trial by jury.
The fall cases "fall" into three categories-defects created by defendant's
active conduct, defects arising from disrepair, and defective conditions created
by third persons. The defendant's notice of the defect is not an issue in
the first case, but is an issue in the latter two. Placing each case in the
proper category may not be as simple as it seems.' 46
135. Harold Corp. v. Hlerzberg, 110 So.2d. 683 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 114 So.2d
790 (Fla. 1959).
136. McCain v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 110 So.2d 718 (Fla. App.), cert. denied,
114 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1959).
137. Walker v. Feltman, 111 So.2d 76 (Fla. App. 1959).
138. Jesters v. Taylor, 105 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1958) (both golfer and country club
liable).
139. Mosqueda v. Paramount Enterprises, Inc., 111 So.2d 63 (Fla. App.), cert denied,
115 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1959).
140. Raphael v. Koretzky, 102 So.2d 746 (Fla. App. 1958).
141. Stone v. Hotel Seville, 104 So.2d 847 (Fla, App. 158).
142. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc. v. Sommer, Ill So.2d 743 (Fla. App. 1959).
143. See note 133 subra.
144. See note 139 supra.
145. See note 139 supra at 65.
146. E.g., Pogue v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957),
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Of the thirtcen cases that did not go to the jury, there were four
failures to prove notice, 147 four failures to prove negligeiice,"' and five
showings of contributory negligence. 411
Of the scventeen cases which presented jury questions, five involved
disrepair,' 0 ten involved conditions created by defcndant,"', one involved
notice of a foreign substance, ' 2 and one involved the combined conduct of
a supermarket and its customers. 53
-1. Master-Servant
Workmen's Compensation supersedes most of the common law master-
servant litigation. However, questions still arise when third persons sue
the master.
147. Goldman v. Hollywood Beach Co., 2441 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1957) (grease in
driveway from unknown sources and for unknown period of time); City of Miami v. Lewis,
112 So.2d 268 (Fla. App. 1959) (holes in sidewalk for unknown length of time); Food
Fair Stores of FMa., Inc. v. Patty, 109 So.2d 5 (Mla. 1959), reversing 101 So.2d 881(Fla. App. 1958) (green bean from sources unknown); City of Jacksonville v. Hampton,
108 So.2d 768 (Fla. App. 1959) (steps in disrepair unknown length of time).
148. City of Miami v. Wolff, 112 So.2d 270 (la. App.), cert. denied, 115 So.2d
415 (Fla. 1959) (uneven section of sidewalk); Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 110 So.2d 417(-Ia. App. 1959), cert. discharged (reluctantly), 117 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1960) (fall through
space in bleacher for unknown reason); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Vain, 108 So.2d
638 (Fla. App. 1959) (skidding and falling for unknown reasons); WViner v. \Valn, Inc.,
105 So.2d 376 (la. App. 1958) (alleged negligent construction in using fine ground
terrazzo).
149. Cooney v. Panama City, 165 F. Stipp. 381 (N.D. Fla. 1958) (daylight trip on
raised curb); Leveridge v. Lapidus, 105 So.2d 207 (FIa. App. 1958) (waitress slipped on
known wet floor); Andrews v. Goetz, 104 So.2d 653 (Fla. App. 1958) (trip over broken
concrete in broad daylight, plaintiff knew of defect); Kagan v. Eisenstadt, 98 So.2d 370(Fla. App. 1957) (fall into open stairwell-previously warned about in unfinished build-
ing); Jacobs v. Claughton, 97 So.2d 53 (Fla. App. 1957) (fall over telephone pole in
broad daylight).
150. Banks v. City of Tampa. 112 So.2d 888 (Fla. App. 1959) (sidewalk defect);
Warring v. Winn-Dixie Stores, 105 So.2d 915 (Fla. App. 1958) (holes ini paved parking
lot path); Schutzer v. City of Miami, 105 So.2d 492 (Fla. App. 1958) (crack in side-
walk); City-of Miami v. Lawson, 104 So.2d 600 (Fla. App. 1958) (pothole in street);
Victor Hotel Owners v. Sperling, 104 So.2d 120 (Fla. App. 1958) (defect in hotel lobby
carpet).
151. Deane v, Johnston, 104 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1958) (weighing scales on sidewalk); Bess
v..17545 Collins Ave.,98 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1957) (pipe protruding 1 inches in motel
walkway); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Rosenquist, 112 So.2d 885 (Fla. App. 1959)
(drop-off at store entrance); Singleton v. City of Jacksonville, 107 So.2d 47 (Fla. App.
1958) (no guardrail on part of viaduct valkway); Shell's Super Store v. Parker, 103 So.2d
881 (Fla. App.). cert. denied. 106 So.2d 199 (Fla. 1958) (apple box in supermarket
aisle); Sunday v. Ikinson, 103 So.2d 669 (Fla. App. 1958) (trip on leg of sidewalk display
table just after turning a corner); Saunders v. Kaplan, 101 So.2d 181 (Fia. App. 1958)(dance floor wet after defendant squeegeed it); Durden v. l)ranetz. 99 So.2d 716 (Fla.
App, 1958) (too much wax on dance floor); Millar v. Tropical Cables Corp., 99 So.2d
589 (Fla. App. 1958) (improperly construeced ramp and platforml at race track); Fonts
v. Margtiles, 98 So.2d 394 (Fla. App. 1957) (trip over hollywood bed frame in store).
152. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc. v. Vallarelli, 101 So.2d 161 (Fla. App.), cert.
denied, 104 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1958) (grape Oni supermarket floor).
153. Pogue v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957).
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The employer of an independent contractor is normally not liable for
the latter's negligence. In Van Engers v. Hickory House,' 4 the rule was
recognized that an independent contractor may be so clothed with apparent
authority to act for the employer that the latter is liable for the contractor's
negligence.
The "loaned servant" doctrine was involved in Davis v. Riggle. "  Davis
owned a truck being driven by his employee. Wheel trouble brought Riggle
to the scene with a wrecker. Davis' employee helped Riggle by steering the
truck while Riggle was towing it. Davis sued Riggle for damage to the
truck which overturned during the towing process. The case holds that if
Davis' employee was subject to Riggle's "authority and instruction" at the
time of the accident, the employee's negligence would make Riggle liable
to Davis.
In King v. Young r'15 it was held that the defendant was not liable
for a truck driver's negligence when his only connection with the case was
that of a transportation broker.
One negligence case' 57 involved a scope of employment issue. It was
held that plaintiff's injuries were caused by the acts of an off-duty employee
and hence the employer was not liable.
I. Warranty
The entire Florida warranty law is ably treated in a recent law review
article. " '
The three warranty cases decided during the survey period indicate a
growing area for imposition of absolute liability. In one case,1'5 the "rule
of absolute liability of implied warranty" was imposed on a soft drink
bottler selling an impure product. The court refused to require proof from
plaintiff that there was no tampering or opportunity for tampering after
the bottle left the plant.
In another case,' electrical cable for underground use proved useless.
The contractor replaced it and then sued the wholesaler and manufacturer
involved. Both defendants were liable to the plaintiff for breach of implied
warranty and the wholesaler recovered on its cross-claim against the manu-
facturer. The case squarely held that privity between tie contractor and
manufacturer was unnecessary.
154. 104 So.2d 843 (Fla. App. 1958). 'Compare: Miller v. Sinclair Ref. Co.; 268
F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1959).
155. 105 So.2d 600 (Fla. App. 1958).
156. 107 So.2d 751 (Fla. App. 1958).
157. American Cas. Co. v. Pearce, 101 So.2d 440 (Fla. App. 1958).
158. Parkinson & Sanders, Implied Warranty in Florida, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 241
(1959).
159. Miami Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1958).
160. Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. "Red" Cornelius, 104 So.2d 40 (FIa. App.
1958).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In a Fifth Circuit decision,"" it was held that even under a warranty
theory, one who rents a car must prove negligence to recover against the
rental agency for injuries caused by mechanical defects.
J. Defenses in Common Law Cases
The defenses to common law actions have been considered throughout
this article in the factual context of various types of cases. However, there
are a number of decisions pronouncing holdings of broad general application.
1. CONTRIBUTIORY NECLICENCE
Deane v. Johnston'62 is an important decision which reviews the entire
body of law concerning nuisance and contributory negligence and holds the
defense available when the nuisance is intentionally created but there is no
intent to injure another. "Intent" as here used "means the actor acts for
the purpose of causing an invasion of another's interest or knows that such
invasion is resulting, or is substantially certain to result, from his conduct.
It is not enough that the act itself is intentionally done."' 63 Although there
is considerable authority to the contrary, the Deane case is based on
reasoning and theory which is virtually unanswerable. The opinion will
unquestionably influence the growth of the law throughout the country. In
Deane, the plaintiff tripped over sidewalk weighing scales. Although she knew
the scales were there, her contributory negligence was held a jury question
under the "distraction rule." HICr attention was diverted when her employer
called to her, and she was also looking at traffic and a traffic light. The
case holds that contributory negligence is a jury question when attention is
diverted from a known danger by a sufficient cause.
16 4
In Schweikert v. Palm Beach Speedway,'05 the court reaffirmed the rule
that until placed on notice to the contrary, invitees have a right to assume
that reasonable care has been exercised for their safety and that "the general
public is not required to be extra careful to look for dangers while walking
on the premises."
2. AssuMnPTON OF Risc
The difference between contributory negligence and assumption of risk
is the subject of much debate. Generally speaking, what is involved is the
difference betwen standing behind a mule and pulling its tail.' 66
161. Clarkson v. Hertz Corp., 266 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1959).
162. 104 So.2d 3, 65 A.L.R.2d 957 (Fla. 1958).
163. Id. at 8, 65 A.L.R.2d at 963.
164. Sinitz v. Shapiro, 100 So.2d 458 (Fla. App. 1958), reaches the same conclusion.
165. 100 So.2d 804 (Fla. 1958). Accord, Wallace v. Boca Raton Properties, 99 So.2d
637, 640 (Fla. App. 1958) (plaintiff "was not required to inspect or look out for danger
in circumstances where he had no reason to expect it").
166. "Some courts have stated that assumption of risk is a mental condition of will-
ingness, whereas contributory negligence is more a matter of conduct." Byers v. Gunn,
81 So.2d 723, 727 (Fla. 1955).
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Assumption of risk usually is not applicable unless there is a contrac,
tual relationship between the parties, although it is sometimes applied tG
certain "spontaneous acts" of the plaintiff.1"7 The defense was discussed in
two landlord-tenant cases. In one, "'s it was held a jury question when the
tenant lit a gas stove after reporting trouble to the landlord and receiving the
landlord's assurance that it was in good condition. In the other,1 9 it was
held that the tenant assumed the risk of injury from falling plaster when lie
knew of the condition and "voluntarily chose to remain exposed to it."
In Brady v. Kane,170 the court held that while a member of a golf
foursome may assume "certain obvious and ordinary risks of the sport," he
does not assume risks resulting from "improper and unauthorized negligent
action of another player."
3. RELEASE
In 1957, Section 54.28 of the Florida Statutes was enacted. The statute
abolishes the common law rule that release of one joint tortfeasor releases
all other joint tortfeasors. Provision is made to deduct any prior settlement
from any verdict obtained and provides that the fact of such a settlement
"shall not be made known to the jury.''
The statute applies to malicious prosecution actions" '-' and should apply
to any settlement after the effective date of the statute although the accident
occurred prior thereto. The effect of a contract is normally determined by
the law in effect when it is made. 7
5
In one FELA case, 74 the documents and testimony showed partial
payments rather than a release.
In Ormsby v. Ginolfi,1 '7 a woman signed a release of all claims on pay-
ment of her property damage, thinking she was unhurt in the accident.
It was held that the "mistake of fact" issue presented a jury question when
the plaintiff subsequently discovered she was injured. I-lowevcr, unexpected
consequences from known injuries will not invalidate a release.' 7"
167. Byers v. Gunn, supra note 166.
168. Propper v. Kesner, 104 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1958).
169. Perlman v. Kraemer, 104 So.2d 609 (Fla. App. 1958).
170. 111 So.2d 472 (Fla. App. 1959).
171. Cf. Caraway v. ain, 23 F.R.D. 657 (N.D. Fla. 1959).
172. Adler v. Segal, 108 So.2d 773 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 113 So.2d 834 (Fla.
1959).
173. The question was raised but not decided in Greyhound Corp. v. Kelly, 104 So.2d
471 (Fla. App. 1958), as the court dismissed the interlocutory common law appeal.
Cf. Arsenault v. Thomas, 104 So.2d 120 (Fla. App. 1958); 12 Am. JuR. Contracts §
240 (1938); Smith v. Fenner, 161 A.2d 150 (Pa. 1960).
174. Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Misak, 102 So.2d 295 (Fla. 1958).
175. 107 So.2d 272 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 114 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
176 Sutton v. Gapetanidis, 97 So.2d 200 (Fla. App. 1957), cert. denied, 101 So.2d
815 (Fla. 1958).
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4. IMmuNrry
The abolition of municipal inmunity in the Hargrove case' 77 produced
one of the greatest opinions ever written in this State. Here again, a rule
which shields a wrongdoer and denies the innocent a recovery could not sur-
vive in a modern democracy.
The Hargrove opinion makes it very clear that "legislative or judicial, or
quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial" immunity issues involve different con-
siderations and are not affected by the decision.
The aftermath of Hargrove has produced cases holding no immunity
in the municipal operation of traffic control signals;78 no immunity of a
city for the torts of its police officers under the doctrine of respondeat
superior;" and a holding that the Florida State Turnpike Authority is a
state agency immune from suit.180
5. MUNICIPAL NoIrcE PROVISIONS
Florida municipalities commonly require written notice of an accident
within 30 or 60 days. Some municipalities have gone so far as to require
suit within 30 days.'" The rank injustice caused by these provisions con-
tinued during the last two years. However, there were several decisions which
tempered the law to avoid gross miscarriages of justice.
In Tillnan v. City of Pomtpano Beach,1"2 the court divided 4-3 in hold-
ing the city estopped to raise a 30 day notice provision. A city truck ran into
the rear of plaintiff's automobile. The city had immediate actual notice of
the accident; the city officials to whom written notice was to be given con-
ducted an investigation; and an agent of the city assured plaintiff that the
city was liable and discussed settlement on that basis.
The O'Connor case xsq is the perfect illustration of the monstrous results
which municipal notice provisions can cause. Plaintiff was injured oi a city
bus. Failure to bring suit within 30 days was held fatal though an insurance
adjustor for the city's insurance company went to the hospital and told the
injured woman not to get a lawyer "as that would delay a settlement."
The Monchek'84 case shows that difference in wording can lead to
different results in notice provision cases. The charter provision involved
required reasonable specifications "as would enable the city officials to investi-
gate the matter." rhlle minor plaintiff was injured on a city lot where sewer
177. llargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130, 60 A.L.R.2d 1193 (Fla. 1957).
178. Hewitt v. Venable, 109 So.2d 185 (Fa. App. 1959).
179. Ragans v. City of Jacksonville, 106 So,2d 860 (Fla. App. 1958).
180. Spangler v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 106 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1958).
181. E.g., O'Connor v. Town of Pass-A-Grille Beach, 107 So.2d 192 (Fla. App. 1958).
182. 100 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1957).
183. See note 181 supra.
184. Monchek v. City of Miami Beach, 110 So.2d 20 (Fla. App. 1959).
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pipe was stored. After the accident the police investigated the accident,
took photographs and filed a detailed written report. These facts, coupled
with a letter to the proper official stating the child was hurt on the day in
question, was held sufficient compliance with the provision. The opinion
also holds the city waived any technical defects in the written notice because
the city attorney's reply to the plaintiff's letter indicated a desire to deal
with the case on the merits.
K. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The res ipsa cases produced one important holding and a number of
decisions finding the doctrine inapplicable to particular facts.
In the McCrea case, 8" it was held that one is not precluded from relying
on res ipsa merely because he introduces evidence of specific acts of negli-
gence attributable to defendant. However, the supreme court's opinion
discharging certiorari indicates that the contrary is true when the evidence
reveals all the facts and circumstances surrounding the injury and establishes
thc precise cause of the accident.
Factually, the doctrine was held inapplicable in cases when: a rental
automobile suddenly developed power brake trouble and the rental agency
was sued;'8 " a chair collapsed due to a latent defect; 8 7 a protruding object
from a railroad car hit a parked automobile;8 8 and where a glass door fell
for unexplained reasons a half a day after installation.' 9
L. Damages
Most of the cases dealing with personal injury damage law involved
nothing more than the usual excessive and inadequate damage arguments in
particular cases. However, there were two decisions involving the elements
of damages in death actions and a case involving emotional distress.
In the Donat case, 0 parents sued under section 768.03 of the Florida
Statutes for the wrongful death of a child. The death reduced the father to a
mental incompetent and this was held a proper item for consideration in
awarding damages for the "mental pain and suffering of the' parent" under
the statute.
185. South Florida Hospital Corp. v. McCrea. 112 So.2d 393 (Fla. App. 1959), cert.
discharged with opinion, 118 So.2d 25 (Ila. 1960).
186. Clarkson v. Hertz Corp., 266 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1959).
187. Mosqoeda v. Paramount Enterprises, Inc., 111 So.2d 63 (Fla. App.), cert.
denied, 115 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1959).
188. Martin v. Powell, 101 So.2d 610 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 104 So.2d 596
(Fla. 1958).
189. Wagner v. Associated Shower Door Co., 99 So.2d 619 (Fla. App. 1958). Cf.
McKinney Supply Company v. Orovitz, 96 So.2d 209 (Fin. 1957) (jury verdict for
defendant affirmed in unexplained fire case).
190. 106 So.2d 593 (Fa. App. 1958).
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In Fowtkes v. Sinnamon,1D1 the court assumed for the sake of argument
that punitive damages were recoverable in a survival action pursuant to
section 45.11 of the Florida Statutes. The court then held that compensa-
tory damages must be shown as a predicate for the allowance of punitive
damages.
In the Slocu, case, 9-2 a shopper suffered emotional distress and a heart
attack after defendant's employee said ". . . you stink to me." It was alleged
that the utterance was malicious or with intent to inflict emotional dis-
turbance. It was held that no cause of action was alleged because under an
objective standard the language was not actionable. What rule would be
followed in Florida when the words were "objectively" abusive was left
open for future determination.
IV. OTHER COMMON LAW TORTS
There were very few tort cases that were not personal injury negligence
actions.
In Lingard v. Kiraly,D3 an action was brought by a discharged employee
to recover for tortious interference with his employment contract. The opin-
ion recognized the individual's right "to pursue his employment free from
malicious interference," but found no evidence that defendant's conduct
caused plaintiff's discharge.
The Dieas'9 4 case involved trespass and assault by a loan company
employee. The trial court granted the loan company a summary judgment on
the theory that the acts were outside the scope of employment. On appeal,
the judgment was reversed with a holding that the test is whether the
employer could be supposed, from the nature of the employment "to have
authorized or expected the servant to do" the acts in question. An important
factor in the case was the fact that the conduct "was for business reasons, not
personal."
Scope of employment was also the issue in the Burquest case'95 when
railroad employees, in burning weeds on the right of way, also burned off
plaintiff's land without permission. The issue was held a jury question in
spite of the fact that defendant would not have allowed the conduct had it
known of it. The case turns on the fact that the purpose of the conduct
was to further the railroad's business.
191. 97 So.2d 626 (Fla. App. 1957), cert. denied with opinion, 101 So.2d 375 (Fla.
1958).
192. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc., 100 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1958). Cf. Clark
v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Co-op., 107 So.2d 609 (Fa. 1959).
193. 110 So.2d 715 (Fla. App. 1959).
194. Dieas v. Associates Loan Co., 99 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1957). Accord, Lockhart v.
Friendly Finance Co., 110 So.2d 478 (Fla. App.), cert, denied, 114 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1959).
195. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Burquest, 101 So.2d 828 (Fla. App. 1958).
[VO0L. XIV!
TORTS
In Hutchinson v. Lott,'90 the court discusses the question of excessive
force in effecting an arrest. The case defines necessary force as that which
an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, with the knowledge and in the
situation of the arresting officer, would deem necessary.
There were two malicious prosecution actions. Both stand for the
proposition that defendant's reliance on advice of counsel or the judgment
of a public prosecutor is not conclusive on the probable cause issue if defend-
ant does not make a full and fair disclosure of the facts to such persons 97
Libel and slander litigation produced three decisions on questions of
privilege. It was held that malice is a prerequisite to recovery when a publi-
cation is qualifiedly privileged;"18 that all conmmunications or publications
regarding the requirements or administration of the unemployment compen-
sation law are absolutely privileged under section 443.16 (3) of the Florida
Statutes;99 and that a union business agent has no qualified privilege when
he makes disparaging remarks to plaintiff's employer regarding plaintiff's
ability as a plumber.200
V. CONCLUSION
This survey includes 186 decisions from Florida appellate courts.
Nearly half (89) were written by the Third District Court of Appeal. The
Second and First Districts wrote 38 and 19 opinions respectively. The
Supreme Court accounted for the remaining 40 cases, nearly all of which
were filed before the district courts were created. Over one third of the
cases (66 out of 186) involved reversals for failure to submit jury questions
to the jury.
It seems apparent that immediate steps must be taken to relieve the
vastly disproportionate workload cast on the Third District Court of Appeal.
With three judges, it wrote 89 tort opinions as against 57 tort opinions for
the other six judges in the First and Second Districts. The Supreme Court no
longer has jurisdiction in most tort cases and a great log jam in the Third
District seems inevitable. Whcn one considers that the Third District has
produced nearly an opinion a week in the tort field alone, to say nothing of
the cases decided without opinions or in other fields, its need for additional
judges is crystal clear. Judicial delay is the only alternative.
196. 110 So.2d 442 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 115 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1959).
197. Adler v. Segal, 108 So.2d 773 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 113 So.2d 834 (Fla.
1959); Paulk v. Buczynski, 106 So.2d 100 (Fla. App. 1958).
198. Hall v, Miami Daily News, 104 So.2d 879 (Fla. App. 1958).
199. Greene v. Hoiriss, 103 So.2d 226 (Fla. App. 1958).
200. Teare v. Local 295, 98 So.2d 79 (Fla. 1957).
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